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Disinterested Director Committees
and the Shareholder Derivative Suit
INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, an increasingly popular method of ter-
minating burdensome shareholder derivative suits has been to
create a special litigation committee, composed of "disinter-
ested" directors, which evaluates the merits of the suit and
recommends dismissal if the suit is deemed not to be in the best
interests of the corporation.' The trend in both federal and state
courts has been to accept the decision of the committee as a bus-
iness judgment and thus non-reviewable by a court of law.2 This
trend, however, has been widely criticized as rapidly destroying
the effectiveness of the stockholder derivative suit as a check on
the abuses perpetrated by corporate insiders. 3
In response to this criticism, the Supreme Court of Delaware
1 See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761,771 (9th Cir. 1981); Lewis v. Ander-
son, 615 F.2d 778, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Abbey v.
Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017
(1980); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Grossman v. Johnson, 89 F.R.D. 656, 662-63 (D. Mass. 1981); Gen-
zer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 687 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393
N.E.2d 994,999-1000 (N.Y. 1979).
2 See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761; Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603
F.2d 724; Grossman v. Johnson, 89 F.R.D. 656; Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994.
Contra Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713, 718 (E.D. Va. 1980);
Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 353 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Maldonado v. Flynn,
413 A.2d 1251, 1256 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd sub nom, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Sonics Intl, Inc. v. Dorchester Enters., 593 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1980).
3 See, e.g., Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The
Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96 (1980); Stegemoeller, Derivative Ac-
tions and the Business Judgment Rule: Directorial Power to Compel Dismissal, 69 ILL.
B.J. 338 (1981); Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors,
65 CORNELL L. REv. 600 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Business Judgment]; Note, The Bus-
iness Judgment Rule and the Litigation Committee: The End of a Clear Trend in Corpo-
rate Law, 14 IND. L. REv. 617 (1981).
4 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). This decision by the Del-
aware Supreme Court applies to all entities incorporated under the laws of the State of
Delaware. Due to the large number of non-resident Delaware corporations and the conse-
quent federal diversity jurisdiction, the decision will have wide impact in the federal
courts.
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has adopted a novel approach which operates as a compromise
between a blind application of the business judgment rule5 and
an absolute rejection of the use of special litigation committees. 6
The approach appears to be drawn primarily from a very
thorough article on the subject by George W. Dent, Jr.7 The pur-
pose of this Note is to summarize the state of the law in Ken-
tucky, 8 to compare the approach taken by the Delaware Supreme
Court with that suggested by Dent,9 and to propose an alterna-
tive which could be adopted when the issue arises in this state.10
As background, it is necessary to summarize the problem and
briefly highlight its various components. Stockholder derivative
suits are brought by one or more shareholders on behalf of the
corporation. Any recovery is usually split between the attorney of
the shareholder-plaintiff and the corporation." The shareholder
receives no tangible benefit other than any marginal increase in
the value of his investment resulting from an award to the corpo-
ration. 12
5 A blind application of the business judgment rule occurs when the court refuses to
review a questioned business decision without first verifying that all the requirements of
the business judgment rule have been satisfied. See the text accompanying notes 53-62 in-
fra for a discussion of the requirements of the business judgment rule.
6 The Delaware Chancery Court had concluded that a shareholder has an individ-
ual right to sue, independent of the corporation, which vests upon the directors' refusal of
a demand. This approach in effect rejects the usefulness and authority of special litigation
committees. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251.
7 Dent, supra note 3.
8 See the text accompanying notes 63-105 infra for a discussion of the relevant as-
pects of Kentucky corporation law.
9 See the text accompanying notes 106-35 infra for a discussion of these two ap-
proaches.
10 See the text accompanying notes 136-60 infra for an analysis leading to the pro-
posed alternative.
11 This has engendered skepticism and distrust of derivative suits by the corporate
bar. One commentator noted:
According to the party line, such [derivative] actions are not typically insti-
gated by shareholders who truly believe their corporation has been
wronged, but by lawyers who, to promote fees, spend their time reviewing
SEC filings and, when they detect even the slightest hint of impropriety,
find a shareholder willing to lend his name to a complaint.
Swann, Current Issues Between Corporations and Shareholders: Shareholder Litigation,
36 Bus. LAW. 783, 783 (1981).
12 See generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAWv OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BusINEss ENTERPRISES § 358, at 749 (2d ed. 1970).
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As a prerequisite to bringing the suit, among other require-
ments, 13 the shareholder must first demand that the directors of
the corporation file suit themselves."4 If the directors accept and
file suit themselves, the shareholder suit is precluded.15 The di-
rectors' refusal to sue lies at the heart of the special litigation
committee problem.
It is generally agreed that the decision to sue or not to sue is
dependent on an evaluation of many complex variables, includ-
ing an assessment of the probabilities of successful litigation,
costs of litigation, effects on business relationships and effects on
internal management. 6 Given the nature of the variables, courts
have been hesitant to second-guess directors and have considered
the decision to sue as one within the realm of the business judg-
ment rule, subject to review only if the requirements of the rule
have not been met.' Because one such requirement is that the di-
rectors making the decision be independent-that they have
nothing to gain or lose personally as a result of the decision
made, 8 a special litigation committee has often been imple-
mented to circumvent or satisfy the rule in cases where directors
are named as defendants. Defendant-directors can hardly be
13 See generally id. at 761.
14 Id. at 770. See the text accompanying notes 34-52 infra for a discussion of demand
requirements.
15 Id. at 772. Once the directors accept the demand and bring suit themselves they
are held to the standard of care imposed by their fiduciary duty as directors of the corpora-
tion. Accordingly, the shareholders are not without remedy if the directors proceed with
the suit in a manner detrimental to the corporation. The directors can be sued for a breach
of fiduciary duty. Id. at 457-61. See also Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d
49,52 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 955 (1981).
16 Swann, supra note 11, at 786.
17 This principle is generally attributed to the following quote from United Copper
See. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261,263-64 (1917):
Whether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause
of action for damages is, like other business questions, ordinarily a matter of
internal management and is left to the discretion of the directors, in the ab-
sence of instruction by vote of the stockholders. Courts interfere seldom to
control such discretion intra vires the corporation, except where the direc-
tors are guilty of misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they
stand in a dual relation which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judg-
ment ....
18 See the text accompanying notes 53-62 infra for a discussion of the requirements of
the business judgment rule.
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considered independent in deciding whether or not to sue them-
selves, 1 but the board transforms the decision of whether to sue
particular directors into an "independent" judgment by delegat-
ing it to a "disinterested" committee consisting of directors who
have not been named as defendants in the suit. The committee
evaluates the merits of the suit,2° determines whether it is in the
corporation's best interest to pursue legal action and almost al-
ways recommends against suit.21 This Note will address the ques-
tion of whether such a negative recommendation may effectively
terminate the shareholder suit.
I. HISTORY OF THE SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUIT
The shareholder derivative suit was originally developed as
an equitable remedy to allow shareholders to recover funds
fraudulently applied by a corporation's board of directors.2 The
concept was based on an analogy to the law of trusts and recog-
nized a fiduciary responsibility running from the directors and
officers of the corporation to the shareholders.03 Although the
corporation always was considered a necessary party to the suit,
there was originally no indication that the shareholders' rights
were to be considered secondary or derivative.2" Apparently, the
19 As one court stated, "[w]here the directors themselves are subject to personal li-
ability in the action [they] cannot be expected to determine impartially whether [the suit]
is warranted." Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d at 727.
20 The committee generally hires outside counsel, examines documents, conducts in-
terviews, takes depositions of directors and management, and prepares a report support-
ing its decision whether or not to pursue the suit. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp.
274, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp.
817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
21 But see Joy v. North, 519 F. Supp 1312 (D. Conn. 1981) (special litigation com-
mittee recommended continuing litigation against seven of fifteen named defendant direc-
tors, and this action was cited by the court as indicative of good faith on the part of the
committee).
22 Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Note on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 980, 985-87 (1957). Prunty notes that popular credit for the founding of the deriv-
ative suit is attributed to Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832). He con-
cludes, however, that the real genesis of the idea came from Chancellor Kent in Attorney
General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371, 389-90 (N.Y. Ch. 1817). The first Kentucky
case concerning the issue, Jones v. Johnson, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 649 (1875), also credited
Robinson. See generally H. HENN, supra note 12, at 749.
23 Prunty, supra note 22, at 988. See also H. HENN. supra note 12, at 749.
24 Prunty, supra note 22, at 989.
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shareholders' rights were viewed as "an individual or class action
parallel rather than tangential to the corporate right."'
The shareholders' rights were not construed to be derivative
until the concept was expanded to allow a shareholder suit
against a third party-specifically, against a creditor of the cor-
poration.2 In such a setting, the corporate right was deemed to
be exclusive and the shareholder's right became secondary, ex-
ercisable only after the corporation refused to bring suit on its
own behalf. Eventually the requirement of a demand on the cor-
poration, as well as the concept of the shareholder's right to bring
suit as being secondary or derivative, carried over into the share-
holder-management suits as well.2
Judicial acquiescence in the use of special litigation commit-
tees to terminate shareholder suits occurs primarily because of
the dangers in allowing such suits and because of the history of
shareholders abusing the suit.2 "Strike" suits may be totally
without merit, commenced solely for their settlement value and
with no expectation of securing money for the corporation.-,
Moreover, the costs of litigation, not to mention the adverse ef-
fects on internal "morale" or on the business relationship be-
tween the corporation and the party to be sued, may outweigh
any potential recovery. To safeguard against the various dangers
of the shareholder suit, courts and legislatures have imposed re-
quirements before such suits may be brought, including demands
on directors and/or shareholders, 3' contemporaneous and/or con-
tinual share ownership32 and the posting of security for ex-
2 Prunty concludes that the corporation was originally included as a "passive recip-
ient of the proceeds" primarily to prevent double recovery (additional recovery by the cor-
poration itself in independent subsequent litigation) and to protect creditors from an un-
just distribution of corporate capital. Id.
26 There seems to be no similar concept in the law of trusts. A beneficiary of a trust
could not sue a third party unless the trustee wrongfully refused to sue. 3 A. Scorr, THE
LAW OF TRUsTS § 282 (2d ed. 1956).
27 See the text accompanying notes 34-52 infra for a discussion of demand require-
ments.
2 Prunty, supra note 22, at 991.
29 E.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 786-87.
30 See Dent, supra note 3, at 137.
31 See the text accompanying notes 34-52 infra for a disc'ussion of making a demand
on the directors.
32 E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.245 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981) [hereinafter cited as
1981-82]
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II. DEMAND ON DIRECTORS
The demand on directors requirement was judicially
created,34 but it is now codified both in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (through FRCP 23.1)-e and in most states via statute3
or state rules of civil procedure.37 The requirement is grounded in
principles of judicial abstinence and judicial economy. The orig-
inal purpose of the demand requirement was "to prevent courts
from interfering with the internal affairs of private corporations
until all intra-corporate remedies [had] been exhausted."", The
requirement is consistent with the realization that the corpora-
tion is truly the preferable party to coordinate the suit, since the
shareholder has little knowledge of the facts and no access to cor-
porate books and records. If the corporation complies with the
demand and sues on its own behalf, corporate resources are then
available; in addition, to prosecute it effectively the board of di-
rectors must direct the suit subject to a fiduciary duty. Imposing
such a duty on the board arguably engenders better representa-
tion for both the shareholders and the corporate entity. By di-
KRS] (requiring that the plaintiff have been an owner of shares at the time of the transac-
tion of which he complains); FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (also requiring the plaintiff to be a
shareholder at the time of the transaction). See generally H. HENN, supra note 12, at 753.
33 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1981); See generally H.
HENN, supra note 12, at 781,798.
Ownership and security requirements which have been imposed by statute and/or
procedural rule do not enter into this analysis except, perhaps, as a reminder to courts that
there are procedural safeguards against abuses by potential plaintiff-shareholders.
34 See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882); Shawhan v. Zinn, 79 Ky. 300 (1881).
3 FED. R. CIv. P. 23.1 provides in part: "The [derivative action] complaint shall also
allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he
desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the share-
holders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making
the effort."
36 In Kentucky the relevant statute is KRS § 271A.245 (1981). See note 35 supra for
the language of FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (which is virtually mirrored by the Kentucky statute).
37 E.g., CoLo. R. Civ. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; OHio R. Civ. P. 23.1. See also
Havdek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions-Part 1, 22 Sw. L.J. 767,
767 n.3 (1968).
38 Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative
Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 168,171 (1976).
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rectly involving the corporation, the possibility that the griev-
ance may be resolved without litigation is enhanced, thus easing
the burden on the courts. A further advantage of the demand re-
quirement is that it may often result in a reduction in expense
and time for the shareholder-plaintiff1 since the requirement
generally involves simply mailing a copy of the complaint to the
directors with a notice advising that the plaintiff will sue if the
directors do not.41
As noted, FRCP 23.1 and the comparable provisions of most
states require that the shareholder-plaintiff make demand on the
directors, or state with particularity why no demand was made.41
The criteria for excusing demand vary widely from court to court
and have led some commentators to conclude that the necessity
for demand actually lies solely within the sound discretion of the
court.42 The application of such discretion varies widely in the
federal courts, from a very liberal excuse of demand in the Fifth
Circuit43 to a very strict requirement of particularity in the First
Circuit.4 Enforcement of the demand requirement appears to be
equally discretionary in the state courts. 45
'9Id. at 172.
40 Id. But see Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d 1204,1209 (9th Cir. 1980)
(addressing the sufficiency of authority of those to whom demand is presented).
41 See note 35 supra for the relevant portion of the text of FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. See
also KRS § 271A.245 (1981).
42 E.g., 38 J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.19, app. at
23.1.83 (2d ed. 1976); Comment, supra note 38, at 170.
43 Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (holding that naming con-
trolling shareholders as defendants raised a presumption of "futility of demand"); Liboff
v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1971) (based on liberal pleading requirements;
mere allegations that a majority of the board of directors participated in, approved of, and
acquiesced in the challenged transactions satisfied FRCP 23.1 and excused demand).
44 In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 857 (1973) (holding that the mere allegation of domination and control by directors,
unsupported by underlying facts, did not satisfy the requirement of particularity under
FRCP 23.1). In the Sixth Circuit, a bare allegation of futility of demand is insufficient
without allegations of fact showing how and why the demand would be futile. Lucking v.
Delano, 117 F.2d 159, 160 (6th Cir. 1941). See generally Annot., 99 A.L.R.3d 1034
(1980).
4 The following cases are examples of courts construing futility liberally: Berger v.
General United Group, 268 N.W.2d 630, 635-36 (Iowa 1978) (holding that a general alle-
gation of futility is sufficient if other assertions of fact in the petition are detailed enough to
demonstrate that a demand would have been unavailing); Newton v. Hornblower, Inc.,
1981-82]
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The variety of excuses for failing to make demand on direc-
tors includes: (1) allegation that the directors are controlled by
the alleged wrongdoer; 46 (2) allegation that the directors have a
conflict of interest and could not exercise independent judgment
in the decision to sue; (3) allegation that directors participated in
the transactions attacked;47 (4) allegation that a majority of the
directors were among the alleged wrongdoers; (5) allegation that
demand would result in irreparable harm to the corporation; and
(6) allegation of obvious director opposition to the suit.48
A shareholder may be required to demand that the other
shareholders bring suit if the demand on the directors was fruit-
less.49 This action is generally necessary when the wrong to be re-
dressed is capable of being ratified by disinterested share-
holders.e Because shareholder demand requirements are rarely
applicable in situations involving special litigation committees,51
further discussion of this device is beyond the scope of this Note.52
III. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The business judgment rule is a judicially created defensive
582 P.2d 1136, 1141 (Kan. 1978). On the other hand, Zauber v. Murray Say. Ass'n., 591
S.W.2d 932, 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (requiring the pleading of specific facts and partic-
ularized reasons for failing to make demand) is notable for construing futility strictly. For
an example of its construction in the Kentucky courts, see Maas v. Tyler, 316 S.W.2d 211,
213-14 (Ky. 1958) ("Where it appears that a demand for action would be unavailing or, if
granted, litigation would be in unfriendly hands, such a demand is not a condition prece-
dent to the right of shareholders to sue on behalf ofa corporation.").
46 Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d at 49.
47 Liboffv. Wolfson, 437 F.2d at 122.
48 See Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative
Suit, 73 HARv. L. REV. 746,753-54 (1959-60); Comment, supra note 38, at 173-82.49 FED. R. Cry. P. 23.1 requires demand on shareholders "if necessary." This is also
true of KRS § 271A.245 (1981).
50 H. HENN, supra note 12, at 772-74. In Kentucky the demand requirement on
shareholders appears to be based on a futility standard similar to that required for director
demand. See Security Trust Co. v. Dabney, 372 S.W.2d 401,405 (Ky. 1963).
51 But see Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. at 718 (holding that
shareholder ratification of the allegedly wrongful action by defendant directors could bar
plaintiffs complaint in a special litigation committee case).
52 See generally Leavell, The Shareholders as Judges of Alleged Wrongs by Direc-
tors, 35 TUL. L. REv. 331 (1961); Note, The Nonratification Rule and the Demand Re-
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rule designed to insulate corporate directors and officers when
they make either honest mistakes of judgment or unpopular bus-
iness decisions. One writer has analogized the rule to the protec-
tion afforded other professionals in suits for malpractice.s Built
into the rule are four basic criteria: (1) independence and a lack
of self-dealing or other personal interest; (2) the exercise of due
care in ascertaining the relevant and available facts; (3) a reason-
able belief that the transaction was in the best interests of the
corporation; and (4) good faith or lack of improper motive. 54
Many courts have applied the business judgment rule to spe-
cial litigation committee decisions blindly, without insuring that
the requirements of the rule have actually been satisfied.s Some
courts have limited inquiry to the independence of committee
members and the adequacy of their investigation. Nevertheless,
other courts have allowed inquiry into the reasonableness of the
business judgment of the decision not to sue.57
Additional problems in applying the business judgment rule
to special litigation committee decisions concern allocation of the
burdens of proof and the scope of discovery to be allowed the
plaintiff-shareholder. The courts have generally held that the
business judgment rule raises a presumption that the directors
"exercised, in good faith, their best business judgment in what
they believed to be the corporation's best interests." ' Thus, in
most special litigation committee cases, the burden of proving
lack of good faith, independence or reasonable investigation has
been placed on the plaintiff-shareholder. 9
Courts vary widely in the extent to which they allow discov-
ery by plaintiff-shareholders prior to a dismissal based on the de-
quirement: The Case for Limited Review, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1080 (1963); Note, supra
note48, at 754-59,760-62; Comment, supra note 38, at 182-91.
53 Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTmA L. REv. 93,97(1979).
54 Id. at 111-12.
5 Courts have failed to inquire into the independence of the persons on the commit-
tee, the standard of care exercised by the members or the good faith of the members. See
Dent, supra note 3, at 101 n.28.
4 E.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761; Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778.
5 E.g., Cramer v. General Tel. & Elee. Corp., 582 F.2d 259; Zapata Corp. v. Mal-
donado, 430 A.2d 779.
5 Arsht, supra note 53, at 130.
5 Dent, supra note 3, at 133.
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cision of a special litigation committee. Some courts have dis-
missed for failure to allege lack of independence on the part of
committee members® and some have permitted only limited dis-
covery, 61 whereas other courts would have allowed the plaintiff-
shareholder the full scope of discovery procedures. 12
IV. DETERMINING STATE LAW
To the extent it is not inconsistent with federal statutes, state
law dictates when disinterested committees can be utilized to ter-
minate shareholder derivative suits brought in federal court. 3 In
Kentucky, it is clear that the applicable law is the law of the state
of incorporation of the corporation on whose behalf the suit is
initiated. 4
Alabama,65 New York and, as discussed below, Delaware67
are the only states in which the disinterested committee issue has
been expressly resolved in the state judicial system. Federal
courts, following the direction of the United States Supreme
Court in Burks v. Lasker,68 have made their best estimate of how
California,6s Connecticut,7" Maryland, 71 Michigan, 72 Ohio, 73
Texas74 and Virginia 75 would resolve the issue. The issue has
60 E.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Minn. 1978),
affd, 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980) (plaintiff conceded
good faith and independence of committee); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (plain-
tiff raised no question as to independence or adequacy of investigation of committee).
61 E.g., Gall v. Exxon Corp., 4 18 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
62 E.g., Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d at 278 (dictum).
6 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,486 (1979).
64 See Nelson v. Gammon, 478 F. Supp. 630, 635 (W.D. Ky. 1979); United States
Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Henry Vogt Mach. Co., 206 S.W. 806, 812 (Ky. 1918).
See generally Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 1354 (1964).
65 Roberts v. Alabama Power Co., 404 So. 2d 629 (Ala. 1981).
66 Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994.
67 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779.
68 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
6 Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761.
70 Joyv. North, 519 F. Supp. 1312.
71 Grossman v. Johnson, 89 F.R.D. 656.
72 Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682.
73 Calefv. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980).
74 Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (entire board voted to dis-
miss). Note also that the lower Texas courts had already addressed the issue. See Zauber v.
Murray Say. Assn., 591 S.W.2d 932.
75 Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713.
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never been addressed by the courts of the Commonwealth or by a
federal court attempting to interpret Kentucky law.
The state and federal courts which have addressed the disin-
terested committee issue have each taken the same basic ap-
proach in interpreting state law. Four questions have been an-
swered: (1) Does state law allow a board of directors to initiate
and terminate litigation on behalf of the corporation? (2) Does
state law allow the board of directors to delegate authority re-
garding litigation to board committees? (3) Does the state recog-
nize some version of the business judgment rule? (4) Should the
business judgment rule be applied to allow the committee to ter-
minate a shareholder derivative suit?
In determining whether state law allows a board of directors
to initiate* and terminate corporate litigation, courts have uni-
formly answered in the affirmative. This is only logical given the
fact that the corporation can only act through its directors6 In
Kentucky, the general scope of directorate power is set forth in
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 271A. 175 which states
that "[t]he business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed
by a board of directors. . . ." 7The precise issue framed is whe-
ther "business and affairs" includes the initiation and termina-
tion of corporate litigation. Four courts have been confronted
with language identical to that embodied in the Kentucky statute
and have concluded that it does. 78 Other courts have reached a
similar conclusion by reasoning from language found in United
Copper Securties Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co.: "Whether or
not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause of ac-
tion for damages is, like other business questions, ordinarily a
matter of internal management ... .. 79These courts have then
concluded that the power to discontinue a suit is a logical exten-
sion of the power to institute the action. 0 When the issue is
76 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 505, at
527-28 (rev. penn. ed. 1969).
77 KRS § 271A.175 (1981).
78 Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (interpreting TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACr. ANN. art. 2.31 (Vernon 1980)); Joy v. North, 519 F. Supp. 1312 (interpreting
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(a) (West Supp. 1981)); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco
Co., 495 F. Supp. at 713 (interpreting VA. CODE § 13.1-35 (1978)); Roberts v. Alabama
Power Co., 404 So. 2d 629 (interpreting ALA. CODE § 10-2A-57 (1975)).
79 244 U.S. 261,263 (1917). See e.g., Galefv. Alexander, 615 F.2d at 57.
80 E.g., Joyv. North, 519 F. Supp. at 1318.
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raised, Kentucky courts will probably hold that directors have
the power to terminate litigation.8'
The second issue, whether authority regarding litigation can
be delegated, is easily resolved. KRS section 271A.210 allows a
board of directors to delegate all of the authority of the board to
a committee if the articles of incorporation or the bylaws so pro-
vide.82 Three points should be emphasized. First, delegation is
possible only if the articles of incorporation or the bylaws ex-
pressly provide for delegation. If the articles or bylaws are silent
on the issue, a disinterested committee cannot be utilized. Sec-
ond, if the articles or bylaws do so provide, all the authority of
the board, with a few specified exceptions, can be delegated to a
committee. Standard statutory construction leads to the conclu-
sion that issues concerning corporate litigation can be delegated.
Third, the statute designates no minimum number of members
to be assigned to a committee. Arguably, a committee of one dis-
interested director could make decisions concerning corporate lit-
81 In Shawhan v. Zinn, 79 Ky. 300 (1881), the Court specifically stated that directors
have the power to institute and to dismiss actions on behalf of the corporation. Id. at 304.
The age of the case, however, could affect the weight assigned to it in a modem decision.
Fletcher states that "[t]he board of directors of a private business corporation insti-
tute, prosecute, compromise, or appeal suits at law and in equity which the corporation
brings or which are brought against it, provided, of course, the directors act as a body and
not as individuals in authorizing an action." 2 W. FLETCHER, supra note 76, § 535, at 579-
80. Fletcher's views on shareholder derivative suits were followed in Security Trust Co. v.
Dabney, 372 S.W.2d at 403; thus it is reasonable to assume that his views might be fol-
lowed in this regard as well.
82 KRS § 271A.210 (1981) provides-.
If the articles of incorporation or the bylaws so provide, the board of direc-
tors, by resolution adopted by a majority of the full board of directors, may
designate from among its members an executive committee and one or more
other committees each of which, to the extent provided in such resolution or
in the articles of incorporation or the bylaws of the corporation, shall have
and may exercise all the authority of the board of directors, but no such
committee shall have the authority of the board of directors in reference to
amending the articles of incorporation, adopting a plan of merger or consol-
idation, recommending to the shareholders the sale, lease, exchange or other
disposition of all or substantially all the property and assets of the corpora-
tion otherwise than in the usual and regular course of its business, recom-
mending to the shareholders a voluntary dissolution of the corporation or a
revocation thereof, or amending the bylaws of the corporation.
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igation. s3
Similar statutes were addressed in Lewis v. Anderson,84
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado"' and Genzer v. Cunningham.a0
Each court concluded that litigation decisions can be properly
delegated. This conclusion also is supported both by commenta-
tors 7 and the legislative history of KRS section 271A.210. 88
Turning now to the third issue as to whether Kentucky recog-
nizes some version of the business judgment rule, it is relatively
clear that Kentucky is among those states that do. The rule has
been applied in cases ranging from simple errors of business judg-
ment" to allegations of excessive salaries paid to officers and dI-
rectors. ® The Kentucky courts have applied the rule rigidly, in-
terfering with the management of a corporation only upon a
83 Compare N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1981) (a minimum
of three directors is required on each committee) with KRS § 271A.210 (1981). A Ken-
tucky corporation has an advantage in this regard in that it should be easier to find one dis-
interested director than to find three.
'4 615 F.2d 778, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1979) (interpreting CAL. CORP. CODE § 311 (West
1977)).
M 430 A.2d 779, 785 (Del. 1981) (interpreting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)
(1974)).
8' 498 F. Supp. 682, 687-88 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (interpreting MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. §§ 450.1527-.1528 (1973)).
87 "The directors... can certainly delegate authority to act for and represent the
corporation... , even in matters involvingthe exercise ofjudgment and discretion, when
they are expressly authorized to do so by appointment of committees ..... 2" W. FLET-
CHER, supra note 76, § 495, at 510. While Fletcher notes that the power to delegate is not
unlimited, he implies that he is referring to a limit on the delegation of total power. There
appears to be no limit on the delegation of power, other than that imposed by the terms of
the statute, concerning any one transaction. See id.
88 See Note, Statutory Treatment of Directors and Officers under the Kentucky Bus-
iness Corporation Act, 61 Ky. L.J. 115,138-39 (1972-73). A sentence was deleted from the
House version of the bill which would have arguably imposed liability on non-committee
directors for the negligent and fraudulent acts of a committee. Id. at 139. This attempt to
buffer the board at large from the acts of the committee can also be read as an attempt to
insulate the committee itself from the board, and adds credence to the theory behind an
independent special litigation committee.
89 E.g., Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Ky. 1951). In dismissing a suit
brought against directors for having authorized investment of corporate funds in plywood
whiskey kegs and plywood toilet seats, the court stated that "although the stockholders do
not assume the risk that directors will be disloyal, they do assume the risk that directors
will make mistakes." Id. at 116.
90 E.g., Venus Oil Corp. v. Gardner, 50 S.W.2d 537 (Ky. 1932); Carter v. Louisville
By., 36 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1931).
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showing of bad faith, actual fraud or constructive fraud.9' Prob-
ably the most extreme view of the rule is that set forth in Carter
v. Louisville Railway.9 In upholding the authority of directors to
pass bylaws authorizing themselves to grant directors fees even to
salaried director-officers, the Court stated that "[fit is well estab-
lished that the courts will not interfere with the discretion of a
board of directors in exercising its legal powers by acting within
the limits of its charter, and without fraud, actual or construc-
tive, upon the stockholders, regardless of motives."9 3
Since the courts recognize the business judgment rule, the
only remaining issue is whether they will interpret the rule to al-
low the termination of a shareholder derivative suit by a commit-
tee of directors. It does not necessarily follow that the rule may
be relied upon to allow such a termination. The reasoning that
leads to the conclusion that the business judgment rule permits
such a termination is as follows: (1) the derivative suit is brought
on behalf of and for the benefits of the corporation; (2) the deter-
mination of whether the pursuit of the action is beneficial to the
corporation necessitates consideration of many factors (including
a consideration of the probability of success on the legal merits);
(3) most of these factors are of a business nature and are capable
of being evaluated only by the directors themselves; (4) there
should be some method for terminating the suit if it will cost the
corporation more than it will gain through continuing the suit;
and (5) the directors' responsibilities and the presence of more
business than legal considerations dictate that the directors, not
the courts, are better qualified to evaluate the advantages of the
suit.
The courts that reject this chain of logic do so on the theory
that the shareholder has an individual right to bring a suit that is
somehow separate from the corporate rights upon which the de-
rivative suit is based.94 They hold that any rights which the direc-
91 See Cumberland Publishing Co. v. Adams Real Estate Corp., 432 S.W.2d 808,
812 (Ky. 1968) ("The general rule is that courts will not interfere with the management of
a majority, unless there is actual fraud, or such a wasting of the corporate property as
practically amounts to fraud."); Security Trust Co. v. Dabney, 372 S.W.2d at 406 ("Ab-
sent fraud, actual or constructive, the courts will not interfere with the management of a
private corporation."). ,
92 36 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1931).
93 Id. at 838 (emphasis added).
94 E.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251.
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tors may have over the suit are lost when demand is refused, or
excused as being futile. 95 This reasoning could easily be rejected
by a Kentucky court on the basis of language in Security Trust
Co. v. Dabney,91 in which the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated:
While an injury to the corporation resulting from wrongdoing,
fraud or negligence of corporate officers operates, indirectly,
as an injury to stockholders, the injury to stockholders is secon-
dary and the injury to the corporation is primary. A stock-
holder cannot, as an individual as distinguished from a repre-
sentative of the corporation, sue directors or other corporate
officers for mismanagement, negligence, or the like, on a cause
of action which belongs to the corporation.7
This language is clearly premised on the assumption that the cor-
porate right is primary and inseparable from any individual right
vested in the shareholder.
At least two courts have found state legislative history to sup-
port the application of the business judgment rule to disinter-
ested committee decisions." The court in Genzer v. Cunning-
hamw concluded that Michigan would apply the business judg-
ment rule in the disinterested committee context because it pro-
vides both flexibility in corporate governance and reasonable in-
sulation from attack by dissident shareholders. 1°° A similar con-
clusion was reached in Joy v. North.10 The court in Joy held that
application of the business judgment rule was consistent with the
continual expansion of the discretionary powers available to di-
rectors reflected in the version of the Model Business Corporation
Act adopted by Connecticut. 1°2
Language very similar to that found in Michigan and Con-
9 See Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. at 717. Note, however,
that the court went on to state that subsequent shareholder ratification of the challenged
director decisions would act as a bar to the shareholders' right to sue on behalf of the cor-
poration. Id. at 718.
96 372 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1963).
97 Id. at403.
9 Joy v. North, 519 F. Supp. at 1317-18; Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. at
687.
9 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
100 Id. at 687.
101 519 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Conn. 1981).
102 Id. at 1317-18.
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necticut is present in the legislative history of Kentucky's version
of the Model Business Corporation Act, adopted in 1972. The
previous corporation law was replaced in an attempt to encour-
age corporations to organize under Kentucky law or to locate
their principal business offices in the state.10 The new Act was
also intended to make Kentucky law more responsive to the de-
mands of the modern corporate world.0 The adoption of the
business judgment rule in the disinterested committee setting is
very favorable to the corporate entity for it provides manage-
ment with a very effective method of dispensing with vexatious
shareholder suits. The only real questions are whether it affords
too much protection to the directors, and whether it can be used
to emasculate the most effective-and often the only-method
available to minority stockholders "to call directors and controll-
ing stockholders to account for mismanagement and fraudulent
manipulation."'"
The root of the problem lies in the conflicting goals of the
two underlying legal concepts. The shareholder derivative suit is
often the only remedy available to a shareholder challenging di-
rectorial abuse. On the other hand, the business judgment rule
provides needed insulation to directors who have committed
simple errors of judgment. In theory, the concepts should never
conflict; the shareholder has no cause of action where the direc-
tor makes a simple error of judgment, and the business judgment
rule is not applicable to breaches of fiduciary duty and other di-
rector misfeasance for which an action on behalf of the corpora-
tion does exist. The problem arises in extending the business
judgment rule into areas where a corporate cause of action does
exist, but where it is still not cost beneficial for the corporation to
pursue the suit. The recognition that application of the business
judgment rule in this setting can be abusive of shareholder rights
lies at the heart of both the Dent and Delaware approaches.
V. THE DENT APPROACH
Dent first argues that the business judgment rule is irrelevant
103 See Ham, Kentucky Adopts A New Business Corporation Act, 61 Ky. L.J. 73,74
(1972-73).
104 Id. at 78.
105 Security Trust Co. v. Dabney, 372 S.W.2d at 403.
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because the derivative suit does not seek to impose liability on the
directors for their decision not to sue. Accordingly, application of
the business judgment rule not only fails to satisfy the basic policy
rationale behind the rule but also subjects it to potential abuse by
directors and courts. o8
Dent then divides shareholder derivative suits into three
basic categories: suits against third parties, suits in which a ma-
jority of the corporation's board of directors are named as defen-
dants, and suits in which a minority of the corporation's board of
directors are named as defendants. 1 He concludes: (1) that the
business judgment rule is properly applicable to a board's deci-
sion not to sue a third party; 8 (2) that a suit implicating a major-
ity of directors should never be dismissed based upon the decision
of a special litigation committee; 10 and (3) that a suit implicating
a minority of directors should be dismissed on the basis of a spe-
cial litigation committee decision only after a careful review of
the independence of the committee members," 0 the adequacy of
the committee's investigation,"' and the cogency of its explana-
tion for the decision not to sue." 2
Dent's distinction between the types of suits is based primar-
ily upon his perceptions of internal pressures and his estimates of
the probability that directors will be able to engage in dispassion-
ate consideration of the merits of the suits. In a third party suit
(i.e., against persons unaffiliated with the corporation), the in-
ternal pressures are theoretically minimal and the directors
should be able to weigh the pros and cons of the proposed litiga-
tion without influence."3 Application of the business judgment
rule, subject to its various conditions and safeguards, is therefore
appropriate. On the other hand, in a suit involving a majority of
the corporation's directors, there is pressure both on the inside di-
rectors and even on the outside directors who have not been
named as defendants to seek dismissal of a suit against their co-
106 Dent, supra note 3, at 135-36.
107 Seeid. at 110-34.
1o8 Id. at 110-22.
1o9 Id.
110 Id. at 124-28.
III Id. at 128-29.
112 Id. at 129-30.
113 Id. at 110.
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directors. In such a situation, Dent suggests that a conflict of in-
terest must be presumed and that dismissal should never be al-
lowed. 14
The most difficult situation is that in which only a minority
of the directors are implicated. Arguably, there is less pressure
for dismissal and greater probability of a dispassionate decision.
Given the dangers of strike suits, Dent concludes that the courts
should evaluate the credibility of the committee's decision and
defer to that decision if satisfied that proper safeguards have
been met. All committee members should be non-affiliated/non-
implicated outside directors, and should-if possible-be se-
lected by other non-affiliated/non-implicated directors."m The
court also should attempt to identify the controlling factions of
the corporation in order to insure that the committee members
are truly independent of any factions that may be implicated in
the suit. 116
In evaluating the adequacy of the investigation performed by
the committee, Dent feels that the court should permit discovery
by the plaintiff-shareholder in order to insure that the investiga-
tion was performed with due care" 7 and that all reasonable ave-
nues of investigation were Rursued. To facilitate the evaluation
of the cogency of the explanation for a decision not to sue, the
court should require the committee to describe with particularity
the facts and assumptions underlying each reason not to sue."8
The decision should be evaluated in light of the procedures per-
114 Id. at 111-22.
115 Id. at 126.
116 Dent concedes that determining who controls a corporation can be difficult. Fac-
tors to consider when attempting to determine whether implicated persons could poten-
tially "control" or influence committee members include the number of shares owned, the
number of representatives on the board and their demonstrated influence, corporate of-
fices held, positions held on various board committees, and power to direct and control the
corporate proxy machinery. Id. at 126-27.
117 The due care standard required by the business judgment rule is that care and
skill expected of a reasonably prudent person in similar circumstances. See Arsht, supra
note 53, at 118-21. Dent would require a higher standard. He argues that while the bus-
iness judgment rule is designed to require reasonable care by directors, the circumstances
of a special litigation committee demand a standard which will ensure that every line of
inquiry capable of producing material evidence is pursued. A lesser standard would allow
opportunity for inadequate investigation. Dent, supra note 3, at 128.
118 Dent, supra note 3, at 129.
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formed and the nature of the alleged wrong. Courts should scru-
tinize proposed dismissals of cases involving allegations of self-
dealing or other breaches of fiduciary duty much more closely
than decisions to dismiss other types of claims." 9 Dent advocates
allowing full discovery to the plaintiff-shareholder, 12° but some-
what inconsistently concludes that it should be limited to "rel-
evant matter overlooked by the nonimplicated directors."' 2' Dent
also believes that, because of superior corporate access to infor-
mation and greater corporate resources, the burden of proof re-
garding independence and the adequacy of investigation should
be on the corporation rather than on the plaintiff-shareholder. 12
VI. THE DELAWARE APPROACH
In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,0 Maldonado, a stockholder
of Zapata, brought a derivative action on behalf of the corpora-
tion against the directors, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty. He
did not first demand that the board bring action. The board
created a litigation committee which recommended that the ac-
tion be dismissed. The Supreme Court of Delaware held that the
trial court should inquire into the independence and good faith
of the committee in determining whether to accept the corpora-
tion's decision. 12 The court, however, appeared to restrict its de-
cision to situations where demand on the directors is excused.
The court stated: "a board decision to cause a derivative suit to
be dismissed as detrimental to the company, after demand has
been made and refused, will be respected unless it was wrong-
ful." Wrongfulness is to be determined by reference to the bus-
iness judgment rule.'2
In cases where demand is excused, the shareholders may ini-
tiate the derivative action, but the board can still terminate the
11 Id. at 130.
120 Id. at 132.
121 Id. at 133.
12 Id. at 133-34.
12 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
'24 Id. at 788-89.
12 Id. at784.
12 Id. at 784 n.10.
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action via the special litigation committee. The Zapata court de-
termined that excusing demand does not strip the board of the
power, authorized by Delaware law, to make decisions regard-
ing corporate litigation. 27 Citing a Delaware statute which au-
thorizes the delegation of all authority to one or more commit-
tees, 12 the court ruled that a board of directors could terminate,
by use of a special litigation committee, derivative suits that
would be detrimental to the corporation. The court then set forth
the criteria by which the committee's decision not to sue was to
be evaluated.
The court stated that "[flirst, the [trial] Court should inquire
into the independence and good faith of the committee and the
bases supporting its conclusions."'2 The court noted that limited
discovery may be warranted to faciliate this inquiry."10 The bur-
den of proving independence, good faith and reasonable investi-
gation is on the corporation. The standard of proof to be met by
the corporation is that applied in motions for summary judg-
ment-if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the
moving party is entitled to a dismissal as a matter of law.13' The
court expressly left open the issue of whether a separate trial on
the issues of independence,%good faith and reasonable investiga-
tion may be warranted.132
If satisfied that the committee has met the foregoing require-
ments, the Zapata decision indicates that the trial court may, in
its discretion, proceed to the second step of the test, apply its own
business judgment to the procedures performed and determine
whether the derivative action should proceed.' In making such
'2' Id. at 785-86.
128 Id. at 785 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1974)). In summary, this sta-
tute authorizes the delegation of authority to committees of one or more directors. The
committees may be delegated most of the power and authority that the board of directors
would have sitting as a whole.
129 430 A.2d at 788.
130 Id. See the text accompanying notes 117-121 supra for a discussion concerning the
amount of discovery allowable under the Dent approach.
131 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 788-89.
132 Id. at 787 n. 15. Compare Dent, supra note 3, at 133 (separate trial would not be
worthwhile) with Comment, supra note 38, at 198-200 (separate trial would be useful in
determining the issue of plaintiffs standing). At least one federal court has ordered a sep-
arate trial of the good faith issue. See Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d at 780.
13 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 789. Compare this conclusion with that
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a decision, the trial court should consider the corporation's best
interests in light of applicable law and public policy.134 This sec-
ond step is apparently intended to serve as an "equitable out" for
the trial court should a committee meet the technical require-
ments of independence, good faith and reasonable investigation
yet not appear to meet the spirit of the rule.135
VII. ANALYSIS
The Dent and Delaware approaches differ in several re-
spects. First, Dent begins with the premise that demand has been
required and properly made, but refused. 136 The court in Zapata
draws a distinction between cases in which demand is required
and those in which demand is excused; the court advocates a
straight application of the business judgment rule where demand
is made and refused, but suggests the use of its novel approach
where demand is excused. The distinction, in effect, places the
burden of proving lack of good faith and independence on the
shareholder in cases where demand is required,"- yet shifts the
burden of proving good faith and independence to the corpora-
tion where demand is excused. 36 The Dent approach, in con-
trast, places the burden on the corporation without reference to
of the Third Circuit which would allow the court to conduct its own analysis of the
reasonableness of the business judgment where the shareholder-plaintiff contends that the
decision not to sue is "outside the permissible bounds of the directors' sound discretion."
Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d at 279.
134 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 789.
135 Id. The spirit of the rule is apparently to balance the interest of the stockholder in
policing the board of directors against the interest of the corporation in avoiding meritless
or harmful litigation. Accordingly, if the trial court feels that, even though the technical
requirements are met, it is not to the benefit of the corporation to terminate the derivative
action, the court may, in its discretion, implement the second part of the test to avoid such
a termination. Id. at 787, 789.
136 See Dent, supra note 3, at 105.
137 This conclusion stems from the presumption of good faith by directors which is
built into the business judgment rule. See Arsht, supra note 53, at 130. The Zapata court's
approach treats the refusal as a business judgment which will be respected if the require-
ments of the rule are met. See 430 A.2d at 784 n.10. Accordingly, the burden of proving
wrongful refusal-bad faith, lack of independence, or self dealing-is placed on the share-
holder.
138 Where demand is excused, the corporation can seek dismissal through the special
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demand.
The extent to which the Zapata approach will differ in effect
from the Dent approach depends upon how strictly the demand
requirement is enforced. Under Zapata, a strict enforcement of
the demand requirement will necessarily result in more cases be-
ing decided at the demand refusal stage than would be decided if
liberal excuse of demand were granted. For example, a court
which requires demand if a minority of directors is implicated
would apply the straight business judgment rule to the board's
refusal to sue, but a court which excuses demand if any directors
are implicated would apply the Zapata approach. The burden
would be on the shareholder in the former case, yet on the corpo-
ration in the latter. The Zapata court is thus, in essence, hinging
the fate of the derivative suit on a nebulous procedural require-
ment-the demand-a device which was originally adopted pri-
marily in the interest of judicial economy and restraint."3
Although the goals of the demand requirement are closely re-
lated to those of the business judgment rule,4 0 they are not con-
gruent. The demand requirement is primarily intended to serve
as a vehicle for judicial economy and should be enforced even in
instances where suit by directors is unlikely.1 41 The business judg-
ment rule, however, is primarily intended to provide directors
with protection from simple errors in judgment. The indepen-
dence standard under the demand requirement can be less strict
than under the business judgment rule, and still accomplish the
primary goals of judicial economy and abstinence.'4 Thus the
litigation committee. The burden of proving independence, good faith and reasonable in-
vestigation is on the corporation. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 788.
139 See the text accompanying notes 34-52 supra for a general discussion of the de-
mand requirement.
140 See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d at 274-75.
141 Kentucky appears to have adopted a very strict demand requirement. Demand is
required unless, if granted, the litigation would be in unfriendly hands. Maas v. Tyler,
316 S.W.2d 211, 213-14 (Ky. 1958). One federal court applying Kentucky law declared
that demand was not futile even though three of six directors and shareholders owning
40% of the corporation were defendants in the suit. Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp. at 114.
The court held that where the defendants own less than half of the voting stock and in-
clude "only" three directors from a board ordinarily composed of seven (the seventh seat
was to be filled at the next shareholders meeting-possibly by a director favoring suit), the
chance that the board might opt to induce action in order to avoid the necessity of a long
complicated trial is enough to require demand. Id.
142 See Galefv. Alexander, 615 F.2d at 59.
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best approach may be to adopt a strict version of the demand re-
quirement 43 in the interest of judicial economy, but to allow the
shareholder-plaintiff to proceed with the suit in spite of the di-
rectors' subsequent refusal to sue.
Another difference in the two approaches is Dent's conclu-
sion that decisions of special litigation committees should never
be allowed to terminate suits implicating a majority of direc-
tors, 144 contrasted with the Zapata court's conclusion that such
termination is indeed permissible. Dent's conclusion is based pri-
marily on the inherently suspect influences to which minority di-
rector/committee members could be subjected throughout the
decision-making process. The Zapata court focused on the
board's authority to delegate responsibility to committees under
state law and on the potential abuses by single shareholders who
could "incapacitate an entire board of directors merely by level-
ing charges against them."s The court compensated for inherent
internal influences or structural bias' 46-perceived as crucial by
Dent'47-by giving the trial court discretion to apply a business
judgment analysis of its own.
143 Given the ease and lack of expense in making demand, even though demand may
be futile virtually nothing is lost to the plaintiff-shareholder. On the other hand, there is
always a possibility that the threat of litigation may prod the corporate directors into re-
solving and rectifying the problem. Accordingly, unless there is some immediate risk of
damage which may stem from demand, demand requirements should be strictly enforced.
The court has nothing to lose and much to gain by such strict enforcement.
144 Dent, supra note 3, at 110.
145 430 A.2d at 785.
146 See Business Judgment, supra note 3, at 601 n.14, for a definition of structural
bias.
147 Dent, supra note 3, at 111-17. Simply put, internal influences are those imposed
on directors as a result of their essentially "political" position relative to other directors,
management and controlling shareholders. The ability to "weigh dispassionately" the
merits of the suit is largely dependent on the security of the director's position on the board
and in the company. Id. at 110. It is also a function of the enemies and/or friends to be
made in the decision to sue or not to sue the named defendants. If the defendants are third
parties (outside the corporate group), the decision should be relatively untainted. There-
fore, it makes sense for the court to defer to the judgment of the directors as long as the es-
sential elements of the business judgment rule are satisfied. The more directors and other
corporate insiders involved in the defendant group, the more likely it is that the decision
will be less than dispassionate. See Comment, A Procedural Treatment of Derivative Suit
Dismissals by Minority Directors, 69 CALEF. L. BEv. 885, 894-900 (1981), for a criticism of
the use of even non-defendant outside directors on special litigation committees.
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The question then becomes whether the discretion granted to
the trial court satisfies the fears set forth by Dent: that fellow di-
rectors are too close financially, socially, and philosophically to
make an independent decision to sue one another; that even if the
directors are actually independent of the majority, the appear-
ance of impropriety is detrimental to the entire corporate govern-
ance system; and that, given the destructive nature of a decision
to sue a fellow director, the committee member will be reluctant
to act absent overwhelming evidence of wrongdoing.14
Dent would preclude a committee from investigating the
problem and would require litigation from start to finish. The
Delaware approach allows the corporation the opportunity to re-
solve its own problems, yet provides for judicial discretion to re-
view procedures and to evaluate decisions. This approach ap-
pears to reflect the basic policy considerations behind the de-
mand and business judgment rule requirements-judicial absti-
nence and judicial economy. By giving the committee an oppor-
tunity to resolve the problem without litigation, while allowing
the plaintiff-shareholder an opportunity both for discovery and
for production of evidence that could challenge the indepen-
dence, good faith and reasonableness of the directors' procedures
and business conclusions, the court retains the power to make an
educated deferral to business judgment.
The other major diffeience between the two approaches con-
cerns the scope of discovery allowable to the plaintiff-share-
holder. Dent favors allowing the plaintiff-shareholder full dis-
covery,49while the court in Zapata specifically authorized only
limited discovery.'-' The precise limitations on the discovery pro-
posed by the court are difficult to ascertain. The Court implied
that the full discovery advocated by Dent was not to be al-
lowed.'5' The scope of "limited" discovery, however, varies from
full discovery'52 to discovery limited to the issues of good faith
and independence.'-"
148 Dent, supra note3, at 111-17.
149 Id. at 132-33.
'50 430 A.2d at 788.
151 Id. at788n.16.
152 Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. at 285-86.
153 Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. at 520.
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The discovery allowable should be left to the discretion of the
trial court; this would dovetail with its discretion to review the
business judgment of the committee. If the trial court finds that
the decision of the committee fails to satisfy the spirit of the rule
or that the corporate action would terminate a stockholder griev-
ance prematurely, the trial court should have the discretion to
expand the scope of discovery. A scale should be developed vary-
ing the scope of discovery according to the nature of the situation
involved. For example, more discovery could be permitted in sit-
uations where the majority of directors are implicated than in sit-
uations where only a minority are implicated and the probability
of internal influence is low.
Dent concedes that unlimited discovery can be unduly dis-
ruptive to the corporation, and thus he maintains that it should
be limited to areas not investigated by the directors',4 This lim-
itation is reasonable both because of the plaintiffs ability to ana-
lyze the investigative procedures employed by the committee and
because the burden of proving independence, good faith and
reasonableness of procedures is on the corporation.
CONCLUSION
Kentucky law regarding disinterested director committees is
so ambiguous that a Kentucky court could adopt either ap-
proach. Kentucky's lack of "strike suit" protection afforded by
other states'l5 shifts the balance toward the adoption of a pro-cor-
porate approach in Kentucky. Since the express purpose of the
Kentucky Business Corporation Act is to attract business to the
state, the likelihood of the outcome increases. 56 The optimal ap-
154 Dent, supra note 3, at 132-33.
1"5 Michigan law provides for reasonable costs, including attorney's fees, upon a de-
termination by the court that the suit was brought without reasonable cause. MICH. COmp.
LAWS ANN. § 450.1493(2) (1973). In Kentucky, the only protection against "strike suits,"
other than directed verdicts and summary judgment motions, is the last sentence in KRS §
271A.245 (1981), which provides that "[n]o such derivative action shall be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice... to shareholders... as
the court directs." Id. The theory is that, since the shareholder will not bring a suit which
he knows has no settlement value, minimizing the settlement value by requiring court ap-
proval as a prerequisite to settlement will discourage frivolous suits.
156 Ham, supra note 103, at 74.
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proach would be one that enforced a strict demand requirement,
allowed the suit to continue, and then coordinated the business
judgment rule, the burden of proof and the scope of discovery.
Once demand has been refused and the shareholder has ini-
tiated suit, the corporation should still be permitted to take steps
to terminate burdensome or unprofitable litigation. This could
be attempted through action of the entire board, or via a disin-
terested litigation committee if some or even a majority of direc-
tors are implicated.
The committee should be composed of outside independent
directors. If the committee were to conclude that the suit should
be terminated, it should be required to provide the court with
detailed lists of the procedures undertaken to investigate the
merits of the claim and detailed explanations supporting its deci-
sion that continuation of the derivative action would be detri-
mental to the best interests of the corporation. Given the struc-
tural biases, the burden of proving independence, good faith and
the reasonableness of the investigative procedures should all be
on the corporation. The court should have the discretion to order
and establish the scope of allowable discovery, to probe into the
reasonableness of the decision not to sue and to perform a limited
business judgment analysis of its own.
The scope of the burden of proof, the amount of allowable
discovery and the extent to which the court will probe into the
reasonableness of the decision not to sue should be based on a
sliding scale used by the trial judge within his discretion but
documented and supported by factors such as the number of im-
plicated directors,51 the composition of the committee,'-" the ex-
tent of the procedures employed to investigate the claim 59 and
157 As the number of directors implicated increases so should the level of scrutiny to
be applied by the court.
158 The presence on the committee of inside rather than outside directors may re-
quire closer scrutiny by the court. See Dent, supra note 3, at 111-17. The court should also
consider any indirect involvement that the committee directors may have had in the trans-
action-involvement insufficient to create a lack of independence but sufficient to raise
some suspicion.
159 Investigative procedures performed by a reputable law firm not otherwise in-
volved with the corporation, or by a national certified public accounting firm, should be
subject to less scrutiny than procedures performed either by the directors themselves or by
corporate employees under the direction of the directors.
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the nature of the claim.16
Michael Slone
160 The decision is more suspect if the directors are implicated for some act in which
they allegedly made personal gains. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779
(allegations of manipulation of stock option exercise dates to minimize personal income tax
of director option holders). The committee decision is less suspect where the alleged act in-
volved no personal gain to directors. See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (allega-
tions of questionable payments to foreign governments).
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